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Understanding FDA Regulation of DTC Genetic Tests
within the Context of Administrative Law
Jennifer K. Wagner1,*
How the FDA should regulate direct-to-consumer genetic tests is fiercely contested. Passing a rule or issuing an order is only one down
in the series. There is more to the regulatory game.Introduction
The direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic
testing industry is under considerable
scrutiny by federal agencies and by
Congress1–3 and has been the subject
of scholars’ calls for new or increased
federal regulations.4–9 In March of
this year the National Institutes of
Health, NIH, launched a new volun-
tary registry of genetic tests to help
mitigate the industry’s transparency
problems.10 In April the Secretary’s
Advisory Committee on Genetics,
Health, and Society (SACGHS) made
recommendations to close gaps in
regulatory oversight of DTC genetic
tests.11 In July the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) held public
hearings to discuss its proposed
broad regulation of all laboratory-
developed tests (LDTs),1 congressional
subcommittees considered the topic,3
and the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) announced the results
from its latest undercover investiga-
tion of the DTC genetic-testing
industry.12
The decisions made in Washington,
D.C. are bound to have tremendous
repercussions on the personal-geno-
mics industry’s practices and viability
and may have considerable impacts
on academic genetics and genomics
research as well. Geneticists in the
industry and in academia might be
unaware of how this regulatory game
will play out—specifically, they might
be unaware of what happens after a
rule or order is issued by an agency
such as the FDA. The purpose of this
commentary is to provide a brief
introduction to the ‘‘rules of the1Institute for Genome Sciences and Policy, Duke Un
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relevant legalese. Understanding the
implications of expanding federal
oversight of DTC genetic tests and
debating the appropriate scope and
means to ensure consumer (and
human research participant) protec-
tion requires everyone—legislators,
bioethicists, geneticists, and others—
to be on a level playing field. Here, I
provide a primer on administrative
law, first by explaining the source of
federal agencies’ authority and then
by discussing the procedure under
which agency decisions are chal-
lenged and scrutinized. Subsequently,
I explore the FDA and its proposed
regulation of genetic tests within the
context of administrative law.
Administrative Agencies
and Their Sources of Power
The U.S. Constitution separates
powers into three governmental
branches: Article I gives rulemaking
powers to the legislative branch,
Article II gives enforcement powers
to the executive branch, and Article
III gives adjudicatory powers to the
judicial branch. The U.S. Constitution
specifically delegates all rulemaking
power to Congress13 and authorizes
Congress to do all that is ‘‘necessary
and proper’’14 to carry out that
rulemaking power. Drawing from
these constitutional powers, Congress
creates federal administrative agencies
(which typically are part of the execu-
tive branch) to handle particular
statutory schemes. Administrative
agencies cannot act without authori-
zation from Congress; when aniversity, Durham, NC 27708, U.S.A
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said to be acting ‘‘ultra vires.’’ In addi-
tion to rulemaking powers, Congress
also has the limited ability to delegate
adjudicatory powers to agencies;15
these forums are referred to as ‘‘non-
Article III courts’’ because they are
not within the judicial branch. To
ensure Congress is respecting the
separation of powers established by
the Constitution and not usurping
the role of the judicial branch, courts
require Congress to pass a four-prong
test when it delegates adjudicatory
powers (the test considers Congress’s
motivations for giving the agency
adjudicatory powers, the origin and
significance of the rights to be decided
by the agency, whether the agency is
given specific, limited directions as
to the scope of its authority, and
whether judicial review is available
such that the agency’s ‘‘adjudication’’
can be seen as a temporary decision
upon which courts can later rely).16
When an agency acts to fulfill the
substantive duties delegated to it by
Congress, it must comply not only
with procedural requirements set
forth by the Constitution’s due
process clause but also with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
the outside statute that specifically
applies to the situation, and the estab-
lished requirements of the particular
agency. If the agency is making
a prospective decision based on gener-
alized or statistical facts and the deci-
sion affects a large number of people,
the agency is engaged in rulemak-
ing.17 On the other hand, if the
agency is making a retrospectived.
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decision based on particular, individu-
alized facts and the decision affects
one person, the agency is engaged
in adjudication.18 Under the APA
this distinction essentially hinges on
whether the agency is issuing a
‘‘rule’’ or an ‘‘order.’’19 Whether the
agency is setting public policy
through rulemaking or adjudicatory
decisions is significant because it
determines the procedural require-
ments that are applicable. From a
practical standpoint, setting policy
through rulemaking might be prefer-
able when the agency is prepared to
establish a comprehensive strategy,
whereas setting policy through adju-
dications might be preferable when
the agency needs to take a more
incremental approach to a rapidly
changing or nuanced problem.20
Generally, when an agency is
engaged in rulemaking, there are no
procedural requirements under the
due process clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution.17 Although the APA requires
only a notice and comment period
for informal rulemaking ,21 more
stringent measures are imposed for
formal rulemaking.22 On the other
hand, when an agency is engaged in
adjudications, the due process clause
requires notice and an opportunity
to be heard.18 When the agency’s
adjudication is formal, the applicable
APA requirements are even more
demanding.23 The requirements of
the APA are the default for agency
action and will apply unless Congress,
in an outside statute, specifically
expresses a deviation from these
procedures.24
Challenging Agency Decisions
Agency actions may be challenged on
a number of fronts, beginning with
a challenge to the actual delegation
of power by Congress. The nondelega-
tion doctrine is the concept that
although Congress can delegate cer-
tain tasks to administrative agencies
with specialties required to handle
particular problems, Congress cannot
constitutionally usurp the adjudica-
tory powers of the judicial branch by
giving those powers to agencies and,
moreover, cannot shirk its rulemaking452 The American Journal of Human Geneticsduties by transferring them to
agencies. Accordingly, when Congress
delegates its authority to an agency, it
must provide ‘‘intelligible principles’’
that guide an agency in the agency’s
exercise of discretion.25 ‘‘[T]he degree
of agency discretion that is acceptable
varies according to the scope of the
power congressionally conferred.’’26
Although the nondelegation doctrine
serves important purposes (for
example, ensuring that important
policy decisions are made by the legis-
lature, which has broad expertise and
the ability to balance and prioritize
diverse, competing policy interests
and whose members are elected by
and therefore directly accountable to
the people), challenges to Congres-
sional delegation of powers have
generally been unsuccessful (although
there are exceptions27,28) so long as
Congress limits the agency’s discretion
in a sufficient manner. However, if
Congress has unconstitutionally dele-
gated toomuchauthority, the agency’s
actions—regardless of the agency’s
efforts or rationale—will not with-
stand judicial scrutiny.
Section 702 of the APA provides an
individual disagreeing with an
agency’s action with a right to judicial
review,29 as long as the individual
has exhausted all available remedies
within the agency. In other words,
the agency’s action must be final or
the matter is not ripe for judicial
review.26 When a court reviews an
agency’s decision, the court cannot
substitute its own opinion as to what
action should have been taken.
Rather, a court reviewing an agency’s
actions will set aside the agency’s
determination if the court finds the
agency’s decision to have been ‘‘arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.’’30–32 These are legal terms
of art and provide distinct grounds
for challenging an agency’s decision.
When the court reviews the agency’s
decision, the court ‘‘must consider
whether the [agency’s] decision was
based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment. At
a minimum, the agency must have87, 451–456, October 8, 2010considered relevant data and articu-
lated an explanation establishing
a ‘rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.’’’33
To determine whether an agency’s
action was ‘‘not in accordance with
law,’’ the court will first investigate
whether Congress has directly ad-
dressed the precise question at issue.
If Congress has spoken on the issue,
the agency must follow that congres-
sional intent. If, however, Congress
has not spoken on the issue (i.e., if
the statute is ambiguous or silent),
the agency has the first opportunity
to interpret the statute’s meaning,
and courts will generally defer to the
agency’s interpretation so long as it
is reasonable.32,34,35
To determine whether an agency’s
action was ‘‘arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion,’’ the court
will take a ‘‘hard look’’ at the agency’s
actions and investigate whether the
agency relied on factors Congress
had not intended, failed to consider
an ‘‘important aspect’’ of the problem,
provided an explanation that is
contrary to the evidence, or provided
an explanation that is so implausible
that it cannot be given deference as
agency-specific expertise.31
Case Study: FDA’s Regulation
of DTC Genetic Tests
Within the context of this administra-
tive law, we can now consider the
FDA’s regulation of DTC genetic tests.
Anticipating how the FDA’s decisions
will probably be challenged will assist
us in the promulgation of effective,
well-reasoned regulations and in
minimizing unintended and costly
consequences. Legal advocates for
geneticists will be more effective if
their clients understand the context
within which regulatory actions are
challenged.
The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) traces its roots to the passage of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 (FDCA).36–39 The FDCA has
been amended on countless occa-
sions,40 including—perhapsmost not-
ably for present purposes of regulating
genetic tests—the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA).41 The
Table 1. Targets of FDA Letters Concerning Genetic Tests
June 10, 2010 Letters July 19, 2010 Letters
23andMe, Inc.; Personal Genome Service Graceful Earth Inc.; Graceful Earth Alzheimer’s Test
Pathway Genomics Corporation; Genetic Health Report SeqWright DNA Technology Services, Inc.; Genomic Profiling Service
deCODE Genetics; deCODEme Complete Scan Interleukin Genetics, Inc.; Inerent Health
Navigenics; Navigenics Health Compass DNATraits; Ashkenazi Jews Genetic Disease Panel
Illumina, Inc.; Illumina Infinium HumanHap550 Array CyGene Direct; Metabolic Health Assessment DNA Analysis Test
Knowme, Inc.; KnowmeCOMPLETE Consumer Genetics, LLC; AsthmaGEN DNA Test
Matrix Genomics, Inc.; Matrix Genomics Breast Cancer Panel
The Genetic Testing Laboratories, Inc.; The Genetic Testing Laboratories
DNA Predisposition Test
Sequenom, Inc.; SEQureDx
EnteroLab Reference Laboratory; Gene Test for Gluten Sensitivity/Celiac Sprue
BioMarker Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Gene Essence
DNA Dimensions; Predisposition DNA Test
HealthCheckUSA; HealthCheckUSA Celiac Disease DNA Test
easyDNA; Genetic Predisposition Health TestFDCA and the MDA together ‘‘are
intended to regulate medical devices
to allow the public to receive the bene-
fits that medical research and experi-
mentation provide while at the same
time protecting the public from
increasingly complex devices which
pose serious risks if inadequately
tested or improperly designed or
used.’’42When theFDAengages inpol-
icymaking—whether through rule-
making or adjudications—it must
act within its constitutional scope,
pursuant to the statutory scheme
Congressused to establish theagency’s
delegated authority (notably that of
the FDCA and MDA) and pursuant to
the procedural requirements of the
APA.43 On previous occasions when
FDA actions have been reviewed by
courts, the courts have noted that an
‘‘agency’s reading of its own rule is
entitled to substantial deference’’44
and have found the broad deference
(often referred to by attorneys as
‘‘Chevron deference’’) to be appro-
priate.45 It is clear that the MDA
preempts state consumer-protection
laws that are ‘‘different from, or in
addition to, any requirement’’ of the
federal law.44,46 Moreover, when the
FDA deviates from its own ‘‘settled
course of behavior,’’ it must ‘‘supply
a reasoned analysis for the change.’’47Congress has charged the FDA with
the important task of ensuring that
products marketed to the public are
both safe and effective, giving the
FDA considerable authority to regu-
late genetic tests. However, the FDA
has not comprehensively exercised
its authority to do so. In the past,
distinctions have been made between
test kits, laboratory developed tests
(LDTs), and a subset of complex
LDTs known as multivariate index
assays (IVDMIAs).48 A comprehensive
historical review of the FDA’s past
approaches to regulating genetic tests
is outside the scope of this commen-
tary but is available elsewhere.49,50 In
2006 the FDA sought to exercise its
authority to regulate IVDMIAs,51 but
the FDA did not issue a final rule artic-
ulating its policy.52–54 More recently,
the FDA decided to broaden is regula-
tory strategy to include all LDTs and
requested comments on this plan;
these administrative actions can be
characterized as rulemaking.55–57 In
June 2010, the FDA issued letters to a
handful of recipients and thus under-
took administrative actions that can
be characterized as informal adjudica-
tions (Table 1). In those letters, the
FDA indicated it interpreted the
genomic tests as falling under the stat-
utory definition of ‘‘medical devices’’The American Journal of Human Gpursuant to FDCA x201(h). The FDA
explained during public hearings
held in July58 that a ‘‘genetic test is
only subject to FDA oversight if it is
a medical device; that is, if it is in-
tended for use in the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, or in
the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease.’’59 That the
FDA takes this position is no surprise,
given the constitutional limits to the
FDA’s authority under the MDA. But
what about the genetic and genomic
tests not intended for such health-
related purposes (e.g., what about
DNA ancestry, paternity, or identifica-
tion tests)? What about tests with
multiple intended uses? Who defines
the intended use—the consumer,
manufacturer, retailer, or FDA offi-
cials? The x510k review process for
premarket approval (PMA) has been
described as a ‘‘rigorous’’ one that
has been known to involve 1200 hr
of review per application,44 although
it is unclear whether this description
is a fair representation. It will be chal-
lenging, indeed, for the FDA to
achieve its stated goals of ensuring
public safety without simultaneously
stifling scientific and medical innova-
tion,57 and there seems to be no
consensus as to how the FDA should
proceed.60–63enetics 87, 451–456, October 8, 2010 453
Table 2. Risk-Based Approach to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices70,71
Classes of
‘‘Medical Devices’’ Definition Risk Category General Requirements
Class I ‘‘Devices for which the general controls of the Act
are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance
of their safety and effectiveness. They typically
present minimal potential for harm to the user
and the person being tested..’’
Low General controls, e.g., registration and listing, labeling,
adverse reporting, and good manufacturing practices
Class II ‘‘Devices for which general controls alone are
insufficient to provide reasonable assurance
of their safety and effectiveness and for which
establishment of special controls can provide
such assurances.’’
Moderate General and special controls, e.g., registration and
listing, labeling, adverse reporting, and good
manufacturing practices as well as premarket
notification, special labeling, mandatory performance
standards, risk-mitigation measures, and postmarket
monitoring
Class III ‘‘Devices for which insufficient information exists
to provide reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness through general or special controls.
Class III devices are usually those that support or
sustain human life, are of substantial importance
in preventing impairment of human health,
or which present a potential, unreasonable risk
of illness or injury.’’
High General controls and premarket approval
Device classification depends on ‘‘intended use’’ and ‘‘indications for use.’’Some scholars have called the FDA’s
medical-device PMA program ineffec-
tive and have identified at least eight
serious flaws.64 The FDA regulates
medical devices by using a risk-based
approach and three-tiered classifica-
tion scheme, as summarized in
Table 2. The risk-based classification
of medical devices has been described
as having the potential to be ‘‘some-
what arbitrary.’’65 Determining just
how to categorize tests and their asso-
ciated risks has been problematic,
even when experts consider the
issue.66 Although the criterion for cat-
egorizing genetic tests within this
framework has not yet been fully
articulated, the FDA has hinted that
direct-to-consumer marketing and
sales ‘‘can increase the risk of a
test.’’59 Is this suggestion in accor-
dance with the evidence presently
available? Perhaps for some tests it
is, although it is both naive and
misleading to conceptualize all genetic
tests as being ‘‘medical’’ or health
related, regardless of their potential
psychosocial effects. DTC genetic
tests are diverse and include raw
sequencing or genotyping services
with no interpretation; limited ‘‘recre-
ational’’ information on biogeograph-
ical ancestry; normal trait prediction;
anddisease-risk estimation.Anuanced
approach to risk-based classifications454 The American Journal of Human Geneticswill be necessary because no two
genetic tests—even if they are the
same type—are exactly alike. When
the FDA classifies each genetic test,
that adjudicatory action is subject to
challenge as being ‘‘arbitrary and
capricious.’’ The FDA must devise a
deliberate, well-reasoned basis for its
risk classifications. The FDA recently
hinted at revising this three-tiered
scheme by splitting Class II medical
devices into two subcategories67—in
essence, creating a four-tiered system
with a new category situated between
Class II and Class III. If the FDA sets
a new scheme of Class II(a) and Class
II(b) medical devices, the rulemaking
action is open to challenge as being
‘‘not in accordance with law.’’ Because
Congress is neither silent nor ambig-
uous on the issue, the proposed
subclassification might reasonably be
interpreted as being outside the FDA’s
constitutionally delegated authority
(that is, ultra vires and unconstitu-
tional) and contrary to statutory
requirements. Moreover, although
reliance on recent recommendations
made by SACGHS11 and provision
of multiple public hearings for com-
ments may help the FDA overcome
any challenges that it has made arbi-
trary and capricious decisions, such
reliance would not overcome chal-
lenges that the FDA has acted outside87, 451–456, October 8, 2010the constitutional boundaries of its
authority.
Although the FDA has contem-
plated broad regulation of genetic
tests since as early as 2001,49 the
agency is obligated to justify its
proposed deviation from its long-
standing policies disregarding (or, to
some, neglecting) genetic tests. This
justification should not be difficult
in light of the rapid advances since
the completion of the Human
Genome Project and the growing
numbers of genetic tests available.
But how will all of the existing rules
applied to medical devices be applied
to genetic tests? This is far from clear
and is a laborious task that will require
flexibility to accommodate future
genetic and genomic innovations.
Many questions, including how the
grandfathering provision might be
applied (i.e., will some genetic tests,
such as pre- and neo-natal screening
tests,61 be exempt or excluded from
the pre-marketing approval process
and, if so, how or why?) and how
the regulatory framework might
accommodate modifications of the
genetic tests after pre-marketing
approval, must be addressed. Both
industry and academic geneticists
could be affected by these decisions.
The FDA and interested parties
must make certain that policies are
Table 3. Critical Questions for Agencies Contemplating Federal Regulation of DTC Genetic Tests
1. Has Congress addressed the specific issue? If so, is the agency acting in accordance with that congressional intent? If not, is the agency
interpreting the statute reasonably?
2. Has Congress provided sufficient ‘‘intelligible principles’’ by which the agency can discharge its regulatory duties? In other words, is the
statutory scheme under which the agency is acting a lawful delegation of congressional power?
3. Is the agency considering only those factors that were intended by Congress when Congress enacted the statutes delegating regulatory authority
to the agency? In other words, is the agency acting squarely within the mission with which it has been charged by Congress?
4. Is the agency omitting or neglecting an important aspect of the problem during its deliberations and policymaking?
5. Are the agency’s explanations of its policies in line with the evidence or is some aspect of the explanation contrary to the evidence?articulated and implemented only
after careful consideration of the
diversity of genetic tests available
already, acknowledgment of the
rapidly evolving genomic technolo-
gies, and recognition of existing legal
protections available to the public
through the oversight of other federal
agencies, state-specific statutory and
common-law contract, and tort reme-
dies, as well as after recognition that
FDA action to regulate all genetic tests
as medical devices will probably
destroy these remedies through
federal preemption (Table 3).
Conclusion
It is important for all of us to be
engaged in the debate over the appro-
priate means to regulate genetic tests,
but we must recognize that passing
a rule, regulation, or bill is merely
one down in the series. There is
more to the regulatory game. Once
the final rules are announced and/or
individual orders are issued, the
agency’s actions will be scrutinized
and challenged, blogged and tweeted.
The federal regulatory oversight of
DTC genetic testing68—whether by
the FDA in its authority to enforce
the FDCA and MDA;, the Center for
Medicaid and Medicare Services
(CMS) in its authority to enforce the
Clinical Laboratories Improvement
Amendments of 1988, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in its
authority to protect consumers from
unfair and deceptive trade practices,
or perhaps a new agency if Congress
deems it appropriate69—will be chal-
lenged and reviewed within the
context of administrative law. As
such, the policies articulated through
rulemaking and adjudications will behandled distinctly, and the game will
be played according to the basic rules
outlined here. All interested players
(whether called stakeholders or lobby-
ists, patients or consumers, academic
or industrial scientists, etc.) should be
aware of the rules of the game before
taking the field. Only then can teams
be chosen, playbooks written, fans
generated, and history made.
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